Oil and bunker market update: Escalation vs more oil from the Middle East
The oil market is caught between recovering Middle Eastern supply and the risk of renewed military escalation. Brent is trading in the mid-90s, following sharp swings as expectations have shifted between a prolonged status quo, renewed fighting, and a possible agreement with Iran.
Our central expectation is for Brent to trade predominantly within USD 85–100/bbl for the remainder of 2026 and into the beginning of 2027. Prices can drift lower without a peace agreement as more crude reaches the market. However, attacks on shipping and energy infrastructure could quickly reverse that trend. For 2027, we expect prices to move toward USD 70–90/bbl, assuming a second-quarter agreement allows a more sustained recovery in production and exports.
Price outlook Q4: Escalation risk versus a market drifting lower.
Recent developments underline why we have to work with scenarios. Fresh Iranian attacks, incidents involving commercial shipping, and the substantial US military presence leave the region vulnerable to renewed escalation. Diplomatic signals remain inconsistent, and no breakthrough toward an agreement is confirmed.
At the same time, the market increasingly needs fresh evidence of disruption to sustain price gains. Continued tensions alone may be insufficient if production and exports keep recovering.
We see three near-term scenarios:
- Status quo: The US maintains its blockade and military presence but avoids major new strikes. Crude continues to reach buyers through Hormuz and alternative routes, leaving prices vulnerable to further declines.
- Military escalation: Renewed US strikes or intensified Iranian attacks damage shipping, pipelines, or export terminals. This could interrupt the supply recovery and push prices sharply higher.
- Reduced US involvement: A withdrawal could ease tensions, but reduced protection for commercial shipping could also create a security vacuum. The price impact would depend on whether passage becomes safer or regional instability worsens.
Our short-term USD 85–100/bbl range assumes that recovering supply broadly offsets persistent geopolitical risks. It is not a ceiling in an escalation scenario. Conversely, sustained exports and an absence of fresh disruption could push Brent towards the lower end even without meaningful diplomatic progress.
The risk is no longer merely a few weeks' delay in reopening. The latest political developments increasingly point towards a scenario where the Strait remains severely restricted for a considerably longer period. There is even a scenario where the Strait never returns to its pre-war status.
Crude flows have largely recovered; refined products lag behind.
The IEA’s November Oil Market Report confirms a substantial recovery in supply. Global production increased by 2.3 million b/d in October to 105.4 million b/d, bringing the increase since August to 5.3 million b/d.
Crucially, the recovery is uneven. The IEA estimates that Gulf crude exports, excluding Oman, reached 15 million b/d in October, equivalent to 82% of pre-war levels. By contrast, Gulf exports of refined products and LPG remained at roughly half their pre-war levels. Most crude export volumes have therefore been restored, while the recovery in products remains much less advanced. This helps explain why crude prices have fallen while diesel, gasoil, and MGO remain relatively expensive.
Severely restricted passage through Hormuz consequently does not mean continuously tightening crude supply. Some oil still passes through the Strait, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE use bypass pipelines. Alternative trading arrangements have also helped restore exports. Refined products have fewer alternatives and additionally depend on functioning refineries. The same applies to the global LNG market.
Nevertheless, the flows remain vulnerable. A recovery in production does not guarantee safe delivery, and attacks on bypass infrastructure could affect routes that have become increasingly important. The market can therefore become better supplied while retaining a substantial geopolitical risk premium.
Price outlook 2027: Lower prices, with a deal assumed in Q2.
Our central scenario assumes an agreement in the second quarter of 2027, followed by a gradual normalisation of shipping through Hormuz. Until then, restrictions, elevated transport costs, and the risk of renewed disruption should keep prices relatively well supported, even as continued crude flows limit the upside.
The IEA projects global supply growth of 6.6 million b/d in 2027, compared with demand growth of approximately 2 million b/d. Its balances therefore point towards a sizeable surplus. However, its refining outlook assumes a rapid normalisation of Middle Eastern activity early next year. Our Q2 agreement assumption implies a later easing of some constraints.
We expect Brent to move towards a USD 70–90/bbl range as exports become more reliable and supply increasingly exceeds immediate consumption. Prices may anticipate an agreement before it is signed, but the adjustment is unlikely to be smooth. Negotiating setbacks or renewed attacks could generate substantial rallies along the way.
We do not expect a sustained return to the low prices seen before the war. Inventories need rebuilding, while an agreement would not eliminate instability in Iran and the wider Middle East. Buyers, shipowners, and insurers are likely to continue attaching a higher cost to regional exposure. These factors should cushion the decline, although they cannot prevent temporary moves below our expected range.
During 2027, rebuilding commercial and strategic stocks should absorb part of the additional supply. This supports our expectation of lower prices without an immediate return to the pre-war market environment.
Diesel, gasoil, MGO may be the real energy chokepoint.
In fact, crude oil is no longer the biggest problem in the energy market. The real chokepoint is refined products, particularly diesel, gasoil, jet fuel and marine gasoil.
The latest IEA Oil Market Report shows that global refinery throughput remains almost 5 mb/d below last year's level. The closure of Hormuz has restricted product exports from the Middle East, while Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have added another source of disruption. At the same time, Asian refiners have shown little appetite for significantly increasing exports.
The result has been exceptionally strong refinery margins. The benchmark European gasoil crack has risen from around USD 20 to 25 per barrel before the war to around USD 70 today.
For the bunker market, this matters because tight distillate markets directly affect MGO and can also spill over into VLSFO through competition for blending components. Hence, even if Brent falls following a reopening of Hormuz, bunker prices and particularly distillate-related products may not fall by the same amount.